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ABSTRACT 
 
Amartya Sen’s capability approach is, on the one hand, in line with universalism such as 
exhibited in Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Len Doyal and Ian Gough’s 
human need theory. On the other hand, his approach puts priority on people’s “self-evaluation” 
of capabilities and needs. The latter emphasis makes his approach distinctly sensitive to 
people’s differences such as gender, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, etc.. One could 
ask, however, how successfully the former commitment to universalism relates to this latter 
feature that places importance on taking difference seriously. This question is especially 
relevant with respect to global justice and gender, for example. To offer a potential answers to 
this question is main goal of this paper. 
 
My answer will come from contrasting his theory with two related but distinct theories, and 
from connecting his discourse about need construction, identity, and democracy with his 
capability approach. His version of universalism I construe could be called “constructive 
universalism.” First, Sen’s theory is situated within universalism. Secondly further 
examination reveals that some distinct features of Sen’s work contrast starkly with other 
universalist accounts. The meanings of such feature are not so explicitly explained in his 
theory. To understand the meanings is the third task of this paper. I will further argue that 
his theory has great potential to take people’s difference seriously, and will present this 
interpretation from the perspective of feminist studies, disability studies, and cultural / post-
colonial studies. How this potential can be realized will comprise the fourth part of this 
paper. I will present the case for understanding his theory as “constructive universalism,” and 
address how this interpretation could solve the above question. 
 
 
                                                       
1 I am very grateful to Ingrid Robeyns and Yuko Kamishima for their helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this article. I am also grateful to Anna Gabrielle Levine for her translation of a partial draft of 
this article. 
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The equal right [……] tacitly recognizes unequal individual 
endowment, and thus natural privileges in respect of 
productive capacity. It is therefore, in its content, a right of 
inequality, like every right. 
[……] [S]ociety [will] be able to inscribe on its banners: 
From each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs! (Marx, 1875) 
Need is also a political instrument meticulously prepared, 
calculated and used. (Foucault,1979) 
 
THE THEORY OF NEED: BACKGROUND  
 
What do these elusive needs entail? Who decides and it what fashion? I will take up the 
former question first. The fact is, that the concept of need has drawn paltry attention from 
economists. Against this backdrop, the figure who has brought this concept into the limelight 
of late, is Amartya Sen. This paper will focuses on Sen’s theory of need, placing this 
author’s work within the span of English literature in this area, especially, in social policy 
and philosophy2. As a result of this exercise, I hope to isolate the main points of contention 
surrounding the principle of need. As to the second question above, I will tackle it above by 
considering how the concept and theories of need can be sensitive to individual difference. It 
is also my interpretation about what Foucoult’s analysis urges us. 
 
Distribution Matters 
 
In what vein has the notion of need been most frequently invoked? There is one cohort of 
scholars who could not help but tackle this topic. The question of need seems to arise most 
frequently in the context of resource distribution, as illustrated by the all too famous words 
of Karl Marx with which I opened this paper. Secondly, I will consider the extent to which 
the language of need is used empirically, in both defenses and criticisms of various types of 
social policy. In contrast to previous periods, the concept of need has come to play a greater 
role. The background that enabled this conceptual renaissance can perhaps be traced to the 
growing concern over the so-called Crisis of the Welfare State and the corresponding 
blossoming of neo-liberalism. 
 
The welfare state could be understood as being composed of two parts. It is a combination of 
a system that primarily seeks to fill demand through the market but also relies on social 
policy to create complementary need-filling mechanisms. (Mita, 1996) 
 
Throughout this process of crisis and restructuralization, the extent to which the state should 
be engaged in the business of filling demand and distributing benefits in the first place, in 
addition to the boundaries and very existence of the concept of need has continued to be 
drawn into question (Yamamori, 2000b). 
                                                       
2 A section of this discussion can be found in Yamamori, 2000b. 
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While the former group of theorists seem to place emphasis on the phrase “according to” in 
Marx’s statement: “to each according to his needs,” the latter seems to emphasize the very 
concept of need itself. Despite these differences in focus, resource distribution seems to be 
the perch from which the notion is explored. I will focus largely on the latter case, a subject 
matter that attracted little-to-no argument prior the Crisis of the Welfare State. “Until 
recently the topic of human need was a largely neglected area of social policy (Hewitt, 
1998,p.61) .” 
 
In like wise, the philosophical endeavor of examining the intricacies of need has received 
very little support (Brock, 1998: vii). The stage has been set, however, for increasingly lively 
debate, and the studies in social philosophy and social policy that have been surfacing since 
the 1980’s are indicative of this trend. 
 
Three Perspectives on Need 
 
In the context of social policy, especially with respect to its relationship to distribution as well 
as redistribution, three distinct perspectives of need can be ascertained. The first concept of 
need has taken hold as the fundamental basis for social policy. In this context, the concept of 
need is intimately linked to the notion of social citizenship. “Universal” (in Titmuss’s sense) 
social policy is generally configured within a welfare state that systematically directs the 
task of institutional redistribution. Social services are thought of as entitlements. In this 
case, in contrast to the second perspective, which I will touch on next, need is interpreted 
rather broadly. It is fair to say that English social policy studies, whether consciously or not, 
have largely come from this perspective. 
 
The second perspective of need is narrower, and although need’s existence is recognized, it is 
restricted to a short list of criteria. In this framework, need is only recognized in cases of 
destitution or “absolute poverty,” perhaps something akin to the targeting of “true need”. 
Selective social policy is led by the residual welfare state. Welfare services, rather than 
being regarded as rights are seen more as privileges that can be distributed at the discretion 
of the state. One could point to Hayek as an example of this perspective. There are a group of 
economists that advocate a social safety-net of sorts, to serve those who cannot provide for 
themselves by standard market participation. As this perspective of need is extremely narrow, 
however, the field of practical argument that it spawns is necessarily restricted. In other 
words, the only way one could make an argument for the second perspective over the first 
would be to claim that the former is unfair. What is recognized as need in the first 
understanding would not necessarily be recognized as such in the second. In reality, however, 
once a need is recognized as legitimate, it becomes quite difficult to strike it from the list 
later. Accordingly, this second perspective, leads into the third, which we will discuss next. 
 
The third perspective denies the very existence of need. That which has come to be known 
as need is in fact no more than want3. This perspective has a cozy association with market 
                                                       
3 See for example Barry, 1999. For other authors see also Yamamori, 1998c. 
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fundamentalism and neo-liberalism4. The extent to which this social policy background 
becomes relevant to discussions of need differs from scholar to scholar. It could be said that 
the most energized discussions of need have taken place in the context of the quest for 
possible justifications of the first perspective, in order to respond to the third perspective. 
 
What is Need?5 
 
I will now outline the most common factors apparent in theories of need. 
 
(1) Need is not Synonymous with Want. 
 
A frequent argument for the difference between wants and needs is that the former is 
subjective while the latter is largely objective. Although, recognizing that there is a difference 
between the two, we should not necessarily draw the conclusion that need is entirely 
objective. I will return to this point later. Need is often conceived in terms of degree of 
vulnerability or urgency. If needs are not fulfilled, harm will be suffered. Escaping this 
result, however, cannot be accomplished within the means of the needy alone. 
 
(2) Fulfillment of Needs takes Priority over Fulfillment of Wants. 
 
Upon clarifying the difference between needs and wants, the priority of need over want is 
justified on moral grounds, with the “Principle of Precedence (see for example Frankfurt, 
1984: 20 or Braybrooke, 1987: 61).” 
 
In its most common understanding, need is instrumental as in the example: “X has a need 
for Y,” this need arising either from an urge to achieve end Z, or alternatively, to maintain the 
state of Z (Z and Z’ one might also label these separate goals). Z and Z’ are therefore also 
instrumental objects of need. The series Z, Z’, Z”, etc.., does not necessarily have to 
continue infinitely. At a certain level of abstraction our Zs tend more to take on the 
characteristics of goals rather than instruments. Below I will discuss two main strands of 
arguments that take place on this level of need: i.e. need as an end. 
 
                                                       
4 It is crucial to note that in all three of these perspectives, the concept of need is closely tied, though 
with varying degrees, to the language of rights. It is, however, possible to imagine a scenario in which 
need and rights do not intersect at any point. In this case, the attempt to define the territory of need 
(the first two perspectives), or questioning the very existence of need (as in the third perspective), or 
the even more drastic arguments that prescribe the amputation of the entire institution welfare from 
the body of government (Nozick), All of them do not make any sense. In the application of the 
concept of needs in the context of social welfare surfaces in Japan, this fourth perspective seems 
dominant. For Further discussion of this vision of need se also Yamamori, 1998b. 
5 This section might be slightly abundant for English speaking people. However, in Japanese social 
sciences and philosophy, the usage of need and want are frequently interchangeable and arbitrary, 
although the usage of those words in Japanese itself has similar distinction with English. 
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2. CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF NEED 
 
The Capability Approach 
 
One of these strands of approaches that address need at the level of goals or objectives is 
Amartya Sen’s capability approach6. In his 1973 work “On Economic Inequality”, after 
juxtaposing the concepts of need and desert, he asserts that the former should take priority 
over the latter. His discussion centers around the meaning of “according to” as in the phrase 
“according to one’s needs.” “The latter half of the thesis, that is, the discussion of need itself 
first began with the introduction of the notion of capability, thereafter elaborating into the 
more finite distinctions between functionings and capability, and between well-being and 
agency, since the 1980’s. According to Sen, information regarding subjective utility or 
material goods alone is insufficient to truly grasp the whole domain of need (Sen, 1980: 367) 
He proposes: “what at issue is the interpretation of needs in the form of basic capabilities 
(Sen, 1980: 368) Capability becomes both a function that people perform and state which 
they reach7. He insist that this interpretation of need as capability articulate what demand for 
equality call. 
 
This widely-known economic critique of the focus on utility has relevancy to the task of 
distinguishing need and want. Sen points to the incongruity of the facts that although utility 
is a rather subjective, almost psychological concept, need and well- being contain distinctly 
objective elements. In search of an alternative construct, Sen poses “functionings” and 
“capability” as objective criteria for determining need. The use of the term “objective,” 
however, departs from its most common usages in the following two manners. First of all, Sen 
places emphasis on the necessity for self- evaluation (Sen,1987,p.32) of capability and 
functionings. Self-evaluation is different from utility, and “self-evaluation is quintessentially 
an evaluative exercise, which none of the interpretations of utility in itself is. …… The 
issue of paternalism, when it does arise, must relate to the rejection of the person’s self-
evaluation (rather than of utility).(Sen, 1987,p.32)” Secondly, Sen’s capability/functionings 
is closely related to the notion of social standard or social norm. To that end, “[t]he 
approach might appear to be largely subjective in the sense that the building blocks of 
judgment are the opinions held in a particular community (Sen, 1987,p.32)”. However, 
social standards and norms are “primarily matters of fact and do not call for the unleashing 
of one’s own subjectivism into the problem of assessment (p.32).” The objectivity that Sen 
points to is not devoid of relational perspective. Sen proposes the framework of “positional 
objectivity” (Sen, 1993a) as an alternate to mainstream objectivity. 
 
It is widely known that Sen’s critique of the overemphasis on material standards of evaluating 
need is a main point of contention he had with John Rawls, however, this condemnation has 
                                                       
6 I do not insist that Sen’s theory must be interpreted as one of need theory. I just insist it is useful to 
interpret above for the purpose of this paper. 
7 This was later designated as function, and the aggregation of these choices are called capabilities 
(Sen, 1985) At this moment Sen did not distinguish between capability and functionings. 
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even broader reaches, in that that it is as a sharp injunction against social policy studies’ 
consistent failure to adequately frame the concept of need. Unlike widely-found theories that 
paint poverty as a “relative” concept, in the capability dimension, need becomes an absolute 
notion (Sen, 1983). The fact that need is an ideal that can be measured by certain standards 
(as exemplified by exclamations such as “Such extreme destitution is absolutely intolerable!” 
or “That is absolutely necessary!”), and is understood as such among people, must be 
recognized, and this common understanding is in fact the departure point for social policy. 
Sen charges that the naïve usage of the notion of relativity washes out the importance of these 
departure points, and insists not only on the existence of need but also on its universality8. 
 
A Theory of Human Need as Objective and Universal 
 
Before I continue my exploration into the universality of the capability approach, I will 
examine Doyal and Gough’s theory of need. There are several compelling reasons for this 
brief diversion. First of all, the Doyal and Gough approach is perhaps one of the most 
comprehensive ones available. In addition, it represents a frontier in the history of theoretical 
undertakings in social policy. Furthermore, their theory, which made its debut in Critical 
Social Policy, in a paper entitled “A Theory of Human Need,” gives strong emphasis to the 
universality of need. This framework was further elaborated upon in their 1991 book by the 
same title (Doyal And Gough, 1991). 
 
Thus far this paper has closely followed the two related but distinct schools as detractors of 
the legitimacy need; neo-liberalism and neo classical economics. According to Doyal and 
Gough, the denial of the notion of need is not restricted to these two tides, but rather, extends 
to a diverse span of broader regions. A total of six distinct areas that exhibit this tendency, 
including Marxism, critiques of cultural imperialism, radical democracy, phenomenological 
arguments (as well as the two tides already mentioned above) can be considered. In all of 
these cases, beneath the superficial surface of light refutations of theories of need, however, is 
the paradoxical acknowledgement of need. Recognition of need, in other words, becomes a 
necessary condition to the very intelligibility of these arguments. 
 
In day-to-day lay usages of “need,” it generally has two connotations: one that evokes drives 
and the other that posits needs as goals. Only the latter has possibilities for universalization, 
as it has a fundamentally more objective nature. Furthermore, basic needs are defined as the 
baseline conditions individuals require in order to avoid serious harm and to avoid social 
deprivation. Physical health and autonomy could be given as examples of such needs. 
 
Although recognizing the similarities between their theories and those of Sen, Doyal and 
Gough assert: “Sen can be criticized for not developing a systematic list of functionings and 
capabilities, despite his own helpful applications of his framework. It is just this which, we 
claim, our theory offers (Doyal and Gough, 1991,p.156)” They further stipulate a list of 11 
                                                       
8 His argument is often understood to contrast the “relative poverty” of industrialized nations with the 
“absolute poverty” of the third world. This understanding, however, is incorrect. For further 
discussion see also Yamamori, 1997. 
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“intermediate needs” including examples such as food and housing that meet the dual 
requirements of universability and operationality. 
 
They also label Sen’s various examples of need as a rather “strange list,” and make the 
criticism that: “Sen needs a theory of need to buttress his notion of functionings (Gough, 
2000,p.7).” Over the last twenty years Sen has developed his capability approach in a vast 
span of literature. Not once, however, has he given a comprehensive list, nor has he developed 
“a theory of need” in Gough’s sense. This critique should be given thorough and deliberate 
consideration. Are these truly drawbacks of the Sen approach as Gough would have us 
believe, and what is the significance of how we interpret these features? 
 
Before I further continue this line of inquiry, it is necessary to touch on the plurality of 
capability approaches. In addition to Sen’s construct, there is another strain of thought that 
does provide systematic lists of capabilities. It is therefore necessary to give this alternative 
consideration before moving on. 
 
 
3. ON UNIVERSALISM 
 
Critical Univeralism 
 
Martha Nussbaum also advocates and develops the concept of capability. Her version starts 
from the departure point of Aristotle and extends into theories that grapple with the status 
women in the third world. In her work a basic list of human capabilities appears. Before 
discussing the differences between the work of Sen and Nussbaum, I would like to briefly 
review the similarities. 
 
Their 1989 coauthored “Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions,” contains a 
critique of cultural relativism that is closely tied to the question of universality. Nussbaum and 
Sen avoid the dichotomy of development vs. tradition. First and foremost, they are of the 
position that the foregone conclusion that development constitutes a social good must be 
rethought. In other words, their position is critical of much of the representative work in 
developmental economics, which is often referred to as universalism or modernizationism. 
These labels are premised upon two types of dichotomies: Universalism vs. cultural 
relativism and modern vs. traditional. These dichotomies are coarse, and we could group them 
all of them with the term of “rough universality.” In response to such perspectives, Sen and 
Nussbaum point to the value-relativity of development. 
 
Another standpoint Sen and Nussbaum shys away from is the standpoint that any form of 
traditionalism is automatically thought of as a social good, which is often referred as 
cultural relativism. Although cultural relativists presuppose each tradition as something 
uniformed in it (and isolated against other tradition), Nussbaum and Sen point to the internal 
diversity of tradition and note the existence of the process of “internal criticism.” 
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In the framework of the two dichotomies listed above, criticizing some form of traditionism 
seems to be equated with rough universalism. However, “[t]he need for internal criticism and 
rational assessment of the values of a culture (……) does not undermine the essentiality of 
the cultural reference or eliminate the fact of the value- relativity of the concept of 
development (Nussbaum and Sen, 1989: 300)” Nussbaum and Sen not only notice the internal 
diversity of cultures, but also note the mutual overlapping compatibility between and among 
cultures. 
 
How, for example, might we understand the example of female oppression in or under the 
name of tradition? The cultural relativist would abide this behavior in the name of resisting 
development. The capability approach offers a means of avoiding falling into such a trap or 
into rough universalism. 
 
Intercultural linkages help, on the one hand, to identify and endorse the 
valuation of these basic, generally formulated, capabilities, and, on the other, 
they may also tend to reduce the differences of specific forms of commodities and 
actions needed for the realization of those capabilities in the respective culture 
(Nussbaum and Sen, 1989, p.320) 
 
M.Nanda, has labeled strategies such as the one presented by this pair (Nanda,1997) “critical 
universalism.” Although Nussbaum and Sen are both perhaps “critical” universalists, the 
way in which they exhibit their commitment to this outlook varies considerably. I will turn 
to this matter next. 
 
Critical Difference between Sen and Nussbaum 
 
As already mentioned above, Sen does not propose a definite list of capabilities. Nussbaum, 
who for a period collaborated with him on developing the capability approach, however, does 
provide a somewhat concrete, and a definite, but “open-ended and humble (Nussbaum, 
2000: 77) ,” list. Although this list takes on a bit of different contour in each appearance, 
among the capabilities listed are: bodily health, imagination, practical reason, and affiliation9. 
 
Nussbaum's approach "began independently of Sen's work through thinking about Aristotle's 
ideas of human functioning and Marx's use of them (Nussbaum, 2000:70)." As for Sen's 
work, she comments: 
 
It seems to me, then, that Sen needs to be more radical than he has been so far 
in his criticism of the utilitarian accounts of well-being, by introducing an 
objective normative account of human functioning and by describing a 
procedure of objective evaluation by which functionings can be assessed for 
their contribution to the good human life (Nussbaum, 1988: 176) 
 
                                                       
9 For the most recent list see: Nussbaum, 2000: 78-86. 
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In response to these remarks Sen admits that her proposal “ would indeed be a systematic 
way of eliminating the incompleteness of the capability approach (Sen, 1993b: 47) ” and then 
goes on to list three reasons why he does not adapt this particular method. 
 
My difficulty with accepting that as the only route on which to travel arises 
partly from the concern that this view of human nature (with a unique list of 
functionings for good human life) may be tremendously over-specified, and also 
from my inclination to argue about the nature and importance of the type of 
objectivity involved in this approach. But mostly my intransigence arises, in 
fact, from the consideration that the use of the capability approach as such does 
not require taking that route, and the deliberate incompleteness of the capability 
approach permits other routes to be taken which also have some plausibility 
(Sen, 1993b:47). 
 
Nussbaum has altered her stance somewhat in response to these critiques. Her current Neo-
Aristotelian approach is intended to be “(clearly unlike Aristotle’s) as a partial, not a 
comprehensive, conception of the good life, a moral conception selected for political 
purposes only (Nussbaum, 2000: 77)” According to Nussbaum, However, the most critical 
factor that sets her work apart from Sen’s is still the fact that Nussbaum propeses a definite 
list, contrasting that Sen has not proposed such a definite list. 
 
Why, despite this abounding concern, has Sen refrained from proposing a definite list? For 
nearly twenty years (since the 1980’s) he has published a massive amount of literature on the 
capability approach. Not once, however, has he suggested a concrete list such as the one 
given by Nussbaum or Doyal and Gough mentioned in the previous section. This curious 
fact should be given brief consideration. It is natural to think that perhaps Sen wanted to 
avoid the almost violent connotations the process of “listing-up” criteria. In this sense, Sen 
is more critically universalistic than Nussbaum. I have in the past compared Sen’s position 
with Edward Said’s commitment to “New Universality”, whose identity and homeland have 
been literally violated by Western- centric Universalism (Yamamori, 2000a) . At the least, 
the absence of a definite list represents not the outcome of time constraints or limited 
theoretical capacity, but rather, should be read and understood as an expression of 
commitment to critical universalism. 
 
 
4. ON DEFINING AND INTERPRETING NEED 
 
Politics of Need Interpretation and Thick Theory of Need 
 
What is at stake in above arguments is to what extent a “theory” of need define content of 
need. From there we are led to even broader conundrums such as: “Who determines need?” 
Nancy Fraser suggested we need a new construct other than a theory of need in the context 
of distribution, for solving this. She contraposes “the politics of need interpretation” against 
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traditional theory of need and justice (Fraser, 1989: ch.7). In other words, she distinguishes 
between need and need discourse (Fraser, 1989: ch.8). 
 
Focusing only on the distribution of need, suggests Fraser, entails the following four 
predicaments: First of all, it takes current interpretation of needs as given and unproblematic. 
Secondly, these frameworks do not consider the matter of determining who should decide on 
which needs will count. Thirdly, such models presuppose the legitimacy of standards agreed 
upon by majority, and finally, they do not problematize the socio-institutional elements of 
the process of need interpretation. 
 
How could authors that I discussed above response to Fraser’s allegations? Before I delve 
further into this question, I will examine the attempt of Glenn Drover and Patrick Kerans to 
construct a “thick” theory of need, by developing Fraser’s argument. They acknowledge 
that theories of need have developed in response to inadequacies both of utilitarianism and 
contractarianism. According to Drover and Kerans, however, “thin” theories of need 
overemphasize objectivity and therefore open the door to over- domination by experts 
(Drover and Kerans, 1993) The “thick” version in contrast, focuses on the process of 
identifying need. The thin theory of need places exclusive 
 
interest in resource distribution, while the thick theory spans its web beyond resource 
distribution to encompass such notions as identity and care, and promotes welfare as a form 
of empowerment. The former presupposes the “unlimited consumption of utility” model of 
human beings. It assumes that subjective notions such as want are strictly distinct from the 
concept of need. In contrast, the latter focuses on the development of human capacity. 
Adapting Benhabib’s distinction between self-realization and self- determination, they argue 
that the list of needs becomes infinite at the level of self- realization; at the level of self-
determination, however, needs can be articulated properly, through a process of critical 
reflection. What saves this approach “from being simply an account of a struggle over 
interests is that a group can articulate needs which are universalizable, hence “true” in the 
sense that in an ideal speech situation there can be common concensus (Drover and Kerans, 
1993: 8). 
 
While there approach stakes its credibility on the premise of a Habermasian mutual greement 
that arises as a product of communication, they also recognize that “an ideal speech 
situation” is neither a natural state, nor an equilibrium point. They note: “In the everyday 
world of practice, therefore, there is no guarantee, only constant struggle. (ibid: 29)” 
 
Additional Needs? 
 
Gough responded to Drover and Kerans’ criticism with the claim that they lead to a 
consequential inability to distinguish between need and want (Gough, 2000: 9) It is also 
worth noting that Doyal and Gough do in fact demonstrate concern for group differences. 
They do not deny that women, cultural or ethnic minorities, people with disabilities require 
that provisions be made for each of their “special” needs. Members of these groups face 
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additional threats to physical health and autonomy. It is therefore necessary that “additional 
and specific satisfiers” be developed. They argue: “there is a place in any politics of need for 
a politics of difference, with particular groups emphasizing and struggling to improve the 
specific satisfiers available to meet the basic needs of their members ( Doyal and Gough, 
1991: 74) .” Taking a cue from feminist critiques of the welfare state, they also recognize 
that both the centralization and decentralization of the welfare state are called for. The role 
of the welfare state, they argue, must be expanded. Simultaneously, however, “co-operation 
and communication within civil society must be nurtured (Doyal and Gough, 1991: 300) .” 
 
Surely their analysis, rather than proposing strict formulae, poses philosophical speculations 
and practice of reflective equilibrium, and thereby takes on a more colorful hue. The practice 
of classifying the needs of minorities as “special” (while on the other hand identifying those 
of the majority as normal or the standard) is, however, not without controversy in terms of 
the implications of the struggle over the right to need interpretation. Additional needs are 
identified only to be subject to reinterpretation so that they might incorporate checks on 
any potential threat to the majority. This results in parcel resource distribution on the one 
hand, and a denial of the legitimacy of their claims itself on the other (Drover and Kerans, 
1993: 24). Seen in this light, Gough and Doyal’s argument comes to resemble this situation 
in theory. In the thick framework, however, it becomes necessary to devise a means of 
approaching a state “an ideal speech situation” in order for “thick” theory to have value 
beyond that of a criticism of paternalism, and to take over a key role in the ongoing battle to 
counter the widely held views of neo-liberalism. Before proceeding along these lines, 
however, it is necessary to return to the work of Amartya Sen once again. 
 
Sen and the Public Sphere 
 
In Sen’s theory, the extent to which one’s self-evaluation of her capability compromise 
prevailing perception of capability as social standards is by no means immediately apparent. It 
should therefore not be assumed that the debate over need- interpretation has thus far taken 
an entirely appropriate direction within the capability approach. Sen does, however, recognize 
that the process of need interpretation itself takes place within a rather separate dimension 
from the narrow focus to need- distribution. Outside of the context of the capability approach, 
Sen notes: 
 
The totality of the human predicament would be an undiscriminating basis for 
the social analysis of needs. There are many things that we might have good 
reason to value if they were feasible, maybe even immortality; yet we do not 
see them as needs. Our conception of needs relates to our analysis of the nature 
of deprivations, and also to our understanding of what can be done about them. 
Political rights, including freedom of expression and discussion, are not only 
pivotal in inducing political responses to economic needs, they are also central 
to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves.(Sen, 1994: 36) 
 
Sen has criticized the dichotomization of need and freedom (e.g. political rights, democracy). 
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The strength of this claim lies first of all in the fact that it identifies the importance of an 
often-overlooked relevance: the relevance of freedom to respond to need fulfillment. I would 
like to pay attention to the relevance of freedom to define needs, in the context of this paper. 
This freedom and political rights that Sen points to could be interpreted as a freedom or 
right to participation in the public sphere. One could also say that this stance gives careful 
respect to the concept of need as a social standard, and respect to the social construction of 
needs10, thereby suggesting that need must take shape within processes of the public sphere. 
Furthermore, however, he asserts that the formalized rights and freedom to the public sphere 
have severe limitations. “It is important to acknowledge, however, the special difficulty of 
making a democracy take adequate notice of some types of deprivation, particularly the 
needs of minorities (Sen, 1994: 36). 
 
Sen doesn’t respond directly to this difficulty, however, he does seem to hint at one specific 
direction. He is wary of considering a single identity as a stable or solid entity. He insists 
that identity is not discovered, but rather, it is chosen by reason (Sen, 1998). In addition, the 
social norms that are the result of the social construction of need, are not a primary point of 
theoretical departure. This concern of Sen becomes clear in the following statement: “[t]he 
prevailing perceptions of “normality” and “appropriateness” are quite central (Sen, 1999: 116) 
” to some sort of question like gender inequality. This awareness suggests a very different 
response than the theoretical treatment like “additional needs” or “special needs” by elicit. It 
will be more sensitive to people’s differences than other universalists11. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS CONSTRUCTIVE UNIVERSALISM 
 
As of the present moment, however, this type of response has yet to be developed by Sen. 
Instead of fully developed argument, there is lots of materials for it in his writings as I 
mentioned in this paper. His discussion about democracy will be one line of its development. 
His “Development as Freedom”, in someone’s eyes, might be too driven to emphasis 
freedom as the good. I rather would like to pay attention that he, at the same time, said 
relatively more theoretically about democracy, and it seems to me that he tries to connect the 
capability approach with the process of democracy. This direction for being sensitive to 
                                                       
10 In theoretical dispute with Peter Townsend, Sen did not reply to Townsend’s critique that Sen 
ignore this problem. See Yamamori, 1997. 
11 Apart from the comparison with Sen, I highly evaluate the following feature about sensitivity to 
difference of both Nussbaum’s approach and Doyal & Gough’s approach. (1) Nussbaum: Nussbaum 
uses the narrative method in her work. It makes her theory positively open to criticisms and revises by 
constructionist discourse analysis. These possible process will be another way to ensure the sensitivity 
to differences. (2) Doyal & Gough: The list of intermediate needs of their theory is not come from 
philosophical derivation. (Their Kantian derivation only deduce physical health and autonomy as 
basic needs.) Their list was induced from some empirical studies. We could separate their 
philosophical theory from this induction. In this sense we could say that they do not have any list. 
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people’s differences could be called “constructive universalism.”12 This naming has at least 
three connotations. Firstly, Sen himself emphasizes the importance of the constructive aspect 
of democracy. Secondly, this line of interpreting Sen can properly pay attention to the social 
construction of need and capability. It is essential if some theory of need aims to be 
sensitive to difference, as I try to explain in this paper. Thirdly, (de-)constructionist 
argument like N. Fraser could be incorporate properly into Sen’s framework in this way. I 
have elsewhere tried to develop that13. 
 
Of course Sen’s capability approach itself is open to other interpretation. It is equal to the 
fact that his theory urge us to combine it with feminist interpretation, but it is not 
automatically guaranteed, and still open to conservative interpretation (Robeyns, 2001). I 
argued elsewhere similar openness related to disability. His theory urge us to combine it 
with social model of disability, but it is not automatically guaranteed, and still be open to 
medical model of disability14. 
 
In closing I would like to stress several points. Sen’s theory can located in line with need 
theories. Need theories have an inevitably universalistic character, and this is a definitely 
desirable feature. At the same time, however, this feature provokes some danger of 
paternalism and violating people’s difference in various aspects. All three versions of need 
theories I discussed (Doyal and Gough, Nussbaum, Sen), try to avoid such danger. Among 
these, Sen’s theory avoids such danger most successfully, and it has a potential for further 
development. This direction could be called as “constructive universalism.” 
 
                                                       
12 Sen suggested this term to me in brief conversation at the workshop on work and idea of A. Sen: 
gender perspective, held at All Souls College, Oxford, September 2002. Of course he is not 
responsible to the usage in this paper. 
13 I already develop “evolutionary political economy of recognition,” integrating Sen’s work into 
Fraser’s strategy beyond what she call “redistribution-recognition dilemma.” It would be argued that 
some revision of this framework would help to develop “constructive universalism.” 
14 See Oliver, 1990. Although he distinguish social creation view and social construction view, I 
include both view into social model of disability here. 
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